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The research

We did not invent
a new science.

Narrative Cognitive Intelligence is an applied synthesis of established developmental research. This page sets out what that means, which research it draws on, what follows from it — and, just as plainly, what nobody has shown yet, including us.

The idea

Narrative Cognitive Intelligence

Three words, each doing work. Together they describe a way of developing reasoning that already existed in the research literature, in pieces, and had not been assembled.

N

Narrative

Nobody reasons in a vacuum. Real thinking happens inside a situation — with people in it, a history behind it, and something at stake.

So the reasoning is practised where it actually lives: inside a story, with consequences that follow and cannot be undone.

C

Cognitive

This is about thinking operations, not about character, virtue, or emotional wellbeing. We are not trying to make your child kinder.

We are interested in what they do with a hard problem— whether they notice an assumption, trace a consequence, hold two goods at once.

I

Intelligence

Used in the older sense: a capacity that develops with practice and experience. Not a quantity a person possesses.

It grows unevenly, it can be exercised, and it looks different at seven than at fifteen.

What NCI is not

It is not an IQ, and it is not a score. There is no number your child has more or less of. Nothing in MindAbs produces one, and nothing in the research would justify one if it did.

It is not a proprietary discovery either. Every capacity it names has an independent, peer-reviewed literature going back decades — executive function, theory of mind, causal learning, metacognition, judgement under uncertainty, human values. It is an applied frame built on that work rather than a validated construct of our own, and the contribution is the assembly, not the parts.

An applied synthesis. A frame for building something. Not a discovery we are asking you to take on faith.

The seven pillars

Why these seven, and no others

Each one was selected because it has its own established research tradition, and because it does something the other six cannot. Nothing was added for symmetry.

01

Agency

Bandura, and self-determination research

Bandura showed that children form beliefs about their own capacity to act, and that those beliefs shape what they attempt. Agency is not confidence; it is the sense that a choice was yours, for reasons you can name.

In the productMindAbs never tells a child which option was better. Owning the reason is the exercise.
02

Perspective-Taking

Wellman, and theory-of-mind research

Across cultures, children develop an understanding that other people hold beliefs and desires different from their own, in a broadly ordered sequence. It keeps developing well into adolescence.

In the productDilemmas turn on a second person whose reasons the child cannot see from where they stand.
03

Causal Reasoning

Gopnik, and causal-learning research

Young children construct and revise causal explanations from evidence, adjusting their beliefs when new information arrives — a process that resembles, in outline, how scientists work.

In the productThe consequence follows from the choice, and sometimes new information arrives afterwards.
04

Assumption Awareness

Kahneman, and judgement under uncertainty

Fast, intuitive judgements are efficient and often right, and systematically wrong in describable ways. The reliable defence is noticing that a judgement was made at all.

In the productThe child is asked what they were assuming — before, and then after, learning something new.
05

Sequencing

Executive-function research, after Diamond

Holding a plan, ordering steps, and keeping track of what depends on what are core executive functions, and they underpin most higher-order reasoning.

In the productStories unfold in time. What has to happen first is a question the story keeps asking.
06

Trade-off Reasoning

Schwartz, on basic human values

Schwartz’s work maps values that recur across cultures and, crucially, sit in tension with one another. Choosing is rarely good against bad; it is one good against another.

In the productEvery dilemma is built on a values tension. Both sides genuinely cost something.
07

Metacognition

Flavell, and reflection research

Flavell named the capacity to monitor and evaluate one’s own thinking. It is teachable, it develops through childhood, and it improves when a person is prompted to reflect at the right moment.

In the productThe third question always turns inward. And when new information lands, the child may revise — or decide their reasoning stands.

Working memory sits beneath all seven rather than among them. It is not a pillar. It is the floor.

The framework

How the seven fit together

The pillars are not a list. They are a structure, and the order matters — each layer runs on the one beneath it.

What they valuetheir own compassAgencythe choice is theirs — and they can say whyMetacognitionwatching their own thinkingPerspective-Takingreads another’s mindCausal Reasoningfinds the causeAssumption Awarenessguess vs. knownTrade-off Reasoningweighs the costWorking Memoryholds the piecesSequencingorders the steps
the stancereflectionthe thinkingthe foundationtheir values
The foundation
Working Memory · Sequencing

Nothing above this layer can run without it. To weigh a choice you must hold the pieces of the situation in mind at once, and know what depends on what. Executive-function research puts these at the base of nearly all higher-order thinking — which is precisely why training them in isolation fails. Held in mind while a story is going on, they are load-bearing rather than a drill.

The thinking
Perspective-Taking · Causal · Assumption · Trade-off

Four operations, each with its own research tradition, each doing something the others cannot. Reading another mind. Finding the cause. Separating a guess from a fact. Weighing two goods against each other. They sit on one level because a real dilemma calls on several at once, in no fixed order.

Reflection
Metacognition

Above the thinking, watching it. Flavell’s insight was that this is a separate capacity: you can reason well and never notice how. It sits above because it takes the layer below as its object— there is nothing to reflect on until the reasoning has happened. Which is why, in the product, the question always comes after the choice, never before it.

The stance
Agency

Agency wraps the whole rather than sitting on top, because it is not a step in the process — it is the relationship a child has to all of it. The choice was mine, and I can say why. Reasoning that the child does not own is a performance for an adult, and we would rather have neither.

Their values
Schwartz · the motivational field

Values enter from the side, not from below, because they do not build reasoning — they pull it. Schwartz mapped values that recur across cultures and stand in tension: security against exploration, loyalty against fairness. A dilemma is only difficult because two of them are pulling at once. Which one a child reaches for tells you what they care about, not how well they think.

This structure is why we do not report a single number. You cannot average a foundation with a stance.

Which is what the NCI Assessment reads

If reasoning is a structure rather than a score, it can be looked at directly — a description of how a child reasons today, across all seven, at one point in time. That is a different object from a percentile, and it is the only thing an assessment of this kind can honestly produce.

The NCI Assessment →
Why a story

Because a child will sit with one

Bandura showed children learn from watching consequences unfold for someone else — not only from instruction. A narrative lets a child make a decision, live with what follows, and pay nothing for it. McAdams’s work on narrative identity adds the other half: people work out who they are by telling stories about themselves.

Where the evidence is contested — and we will say so

You may have read that reading fiction improves the ability to read other people’s minds. That claim rests largely on a well-known 2013 study in Science. When other researchers ran larger, preregistered replications, the effect did not reliably appear. The original authors disputed the replications. The argument has not settled.

So we do not build on it, and we do not cite it as support.Narrative is in MindAbs because it holds a child’s attention across years, and because a story can present a genuine dilemma at no real cost. Those are the reasons. Anyone offering you the fiction-and-empathy finding as settled science is telling you something the literature does not say.

Now the harder question

Does any of it actually
reach the rest of a life?

Everything above is architecture. It says what MindAbs exercises and why those things are worth exercising. It does not yet say whether practice here shows up anywhere else. That question has an answer, and it is not the one the industry has been selling.

The thingyou practiseNear transferclosely related tasksEVIDENCE: GOODFar transferunrelated abilities · school resultsEVIDENCE: THINget better at this↓ does it spread out here?This is the question the industry skipped.

Practise something, and you get better at it. You also get better at tasks built the same way. Researchers call this near transfer, and the evidence for it is good.

The real question is whether the improvement spreads outward — to unrelated abilities, to intelligence, to marks at school. That is far transfer. And here the evidence thins to almost nothing.

A decade of trials on working-memory and brain-training programmes found the same thing repeatedly: children got better at the trained task, and the gains stopped there. Reviews across the field have been blunt about it. One paid a multi-million-dollar settlement for saying otherwise.

This is the fact that killed an industry. Any honest account of a product like ours has to arrive here, and not flinch.

The researcher we lean on most heavily is also the field’s most cited sceptic of brain training. We think that is the right person to listen to.

And yet

The same review that demolished
brain training said what survives

Diamond and Ling read the whole literature and sorted it into what is justified and what, in their words, is hype. What survived shared a shape.

What the evidence points toward

Three conditions, and MindAbs
is what falls out of them

Repeated

Not a course you finish. Something returned to, again and again, over a long time.

Progressively harder

It has to keep stretching. Practice that stops challenging stops doing anything.

Something they care about

Gains show up when the activity matters to the person — not when it is an abstract drill.

Read those three conditions and a design falls out of them. Something a child does most days, for years, that gets harder as they grow, and that they actually want to finish. A drill fails the third condition. A story does not.

That is the argument. Not that we have proven our product works — but that the shape of what does work is known, and we built to that shape rather than against it.

We did not start from a claim and look for evidence. We started from the evidence and accepted what it ruled out.

A question we get from psychologists

Why we never compare
your child to other children

Every assessment a parent has met produces a percentile. Ours does not, and the reason is not squeamishness.

Reasoning develops unevenly. Theory of mind, causal thinking and metacognition each arrive on their own timetable, and the spread between two typical children of the same age is wide, normal, and not predictive of very much. A percentile compresses all of that into a rank, and a rank invites a decision no evidence supports.

There is a second reason, and it is about the child. The moment a score exists, it becomes a thing to optimise. A child who knows they are being ranked starts producing the answer that ranks well. And a child performing for a score has stopped reasoning.

So MindAbs measures your child against your child. What you receive is a description of how they reasoned this month, and how that differs from how they reasoned three months ago.

It is a harder thing to build and a harder thing to sell. A percentile is legible in one second; a description takes a paragraph. We think the paragraph is the honest object.

Nothing in the product ranks a child, and nothing ever tells them how they are doing. Not because we are hiding the data — because the data would change what we are measuring.

Plainly

What we can say. What we cannot.

If a company selling you something for your child will not draw this line, that is worth noticing.

What we can say

  • Each pillar corresponds to an established, peer-reviewed line of developmental research.
  • MindAbs is designed to the conditions that the evidence suggests matter: repeated practice, rising difficulty, and material a child is invested in.
  • Children practise noticing assumptions, taking another view, tracing consequences and weighing trade-offs — because that is literally what a session consists of.
  • Our content is written and audited against a discipline no scoring system can fake: no dilemma has a correct answer.

What we cannot say

  • That MindAbs improves your child’s marks at school. Nobody has shown this, for any product of this kind.
  • That reasoning practised here transfers to unrelated abilities, or to IQ. The evidence for far transfer is weak, and we will not borrow it.
  • That any of this has been proven in children — by us. MindAbs has run no outcome study of its own. Everything on this page rests on published research by others, and on our having built to what that research supports. NCI is an applied synthesis of that work, not a validated construct of ours.
So what are we actually offering?

A safe place to practise thinking

Every day, a real situation your child will one day meet — met early, where the stakes are only a story. They decide. They say why. They live with what follows. Then they are asked what they assumed, whose view they missed, and whether they would choose the same again.

Do that on Monday and it is an exercise. Do it for a year and something else happens: the questions stop belonging to the story.A child who has been asked a hundred times what they were assuming begins, eventually, to ask it themselves — in a classroom, in an argument, in the pause before a decision that actually costs something.

That is the whole offer. Not that MindAbs will make your child cleverer. That the pause before the decision can be practised, somewhere it is safe to get it wrong, until it becomes theirs.

We are not selling an outcome. We are building the room where the practice happens.

For the specialist reader

The technical annex

A fuller treatment for psychologists, educators and clinicians: the construct definitions, the developmental evidence behind each pillar, the design constraints we accepted from the literature, and the limits of what an applied synthesis can claim.

Download the annex (PDF)
References

Read it yourself

We would rather you checked.

Diamond, A., & Ling, D. S. (2016). Conclusions about interventions, programs, and approaches for improving executive functions that appear justified and those that, despite much hype, do not. Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience, 18, 34–48. Link →
Diamond, A. (2013). Executive functions. Annual Review of Psychology, 64, 135–168. Link →
Melby-Lervåg, M., Redick, T. S., & Hulme, C. (2016). Working memory training does not improve performance on measures of intelligence or other measures of far transfer. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 11(4), 512–534. Link →
Simons, D. J., et al. (2016). Do “brain-training” programs work? Psychological Science in the Public Interest, 17(3), 103–186. Link →
Bandura, A. (1977). Social Learning Theory. Prentice Hall.
Gopnik, A., et al. (2004). A theory of causal learning in children. Psychological Review, 111(1), 3–32. Link →
Wellman, H. M., & Liu, D. (2004). Scaling of theory-of-mind tasks. Child Development, 75(2), 523–541. Link →
Flavell, J. H. (1979). Metacognition and cognitive monitoring. American Psychologist, 34(10), 906–911. Link →
Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, Fast and Slow. Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Schwartz, S. H. (1992). Universals in the content and structure of values. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 25, 1–65. Link →
McAdams, D. P., & McLean, K. C. (2013). Narrative identity. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 22(3), 233–238. Link →
Kidd, D. C., & Castano, E. (2013). Reading literary fiction improves theory of mind. Science, 342(6156), 377–380. Link →
Panero, M. E., et al. (2016). Does reading a single passage of literary fiction really improve theory of mind? An attempt at replication. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 111(5), e46–e54. Link →
Pennebaker, J. W., & Beall, S. K. (1986). Confronting a traumatic event. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 95(3), 274–281. Link →
A necessary note. The researchers cited above have no affiliation with MindAbs or ReflectWise Labs, and nothing here implies their endorsement. They are named because their published work shaped our thinking. Where a finding is disputed, we have said so. Where we have proven nothing, we have said that too.

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